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1. INTRODUCTION - THE CURRENT SYSTEM & AN OVERVIEW OF
POSSIBLE REVISIONS
Over the course of the last few years, while the world has
suffered through a financial collapse and recession, more and more
attention has been drawn to what Bloomberg describes as "The Great
Corporate Tax Dodge."' Tax Law professional Edward Kleinbard 2 has
written extensively on the subject and has described the methods that a
multinational corporation ("MNC") can use to reduce its corporate
income tax burdens as the creation of "stateless income."3 Stateless
income represents the income of a U.S. based MNC's foreign subsidi-
aries that is permanently reinvested abroad, but often invested or held
in a jurisdiction other than the one in which the income was earned.
The choice to leave this income abroad, rather than repatriate it, allows
*Student, University of Miami Law. Juris Doctor, Master of Business Administration,
and LL.M. Tax Candidate, 2015.
' The Great Corporate Tax Dodge, Bloomberg (2011), http://topics.bloomberg.
com/the-great-corporate-tax-dodge/. "Beginning in force in the mid 90s, U.S.
multinationals have been avoiding corporate income taxes by shifting profits into shell
companies in havens like Bermuda, the Switzerland and the Cayman Islands. At home,
they have exerted tremendous lobbying pressure on Congress to get a second tax break
to bring those profits back home."
2 Edward Kleinbard. Professor of Law, University of Southern California Gould
School of Law.
3 Edward D. Kleinbard, Stateless Income, 11 FLA. TAX REv. 699 (2011). Stateless
income is defined in the paper as "income derived by a multinational group from
business activities in a country other than the domicile (however defined) of the
group's ultimate parent company, but which is subject to tax only in a jurisdiction that
is not the location of the customers or the factor of production through which the
income was derived, and is not the domicile of the group's parent company." See also,
Id. at 702 n. 1. "The domicile of a multinational enterprise's ultimate parent company
is referred to in the literature as the 'residence' country. A country other than the
residence country in which a multinational group derives business or investment
income is referred to as the 'source' country."
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U.S. based MNCs to defer4 payment of the United State's statutory
corporate income tax rate of thirty-five (35%) percent, and instead
achieve astonishingly low effective tax rates. The total amount of tax-
deferred offshore earnings has been estimated at an amount close to
$1.7 trillion.5
The ability to generate stateless income is not unique to U.S.
based MNCs. The international community has also become acutely
aware in the recent years of the aggressive tax-planning strategies
being employed and the impact those strategies are having on corpor-
ate income tax revenue collections. The Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development ("OECD") recently released a report
(hereinafter "BEPS Report") detailing the impact of base erosion and
profit shifting ("BEPS") on OECD member and non-member coun-
tries.6 The BEPS Report highlights many of the fundamental issues
present in the current system of international taxation.7 The BEPS
Report discusses problems with transfer pricing, 8 corporations'
preference for financing themselves with debt rather than equity due
to tax benefits,9 and MNC's ability to legally shift income from high to
low-tax jurisdictions through the use of corporate structures0 .
However, the overarching theme throughout the BEPS Report is one
that is at the source of all well-planned tax-avoidance schemes: the lack
of a cohesive international plan or system to prevent BEPS allows
MNCs to utilize each country's individual tax system against each
other, thereby greatly reducing or even eliminating their total tax
liability.
In 2013, President Obama, in conjunction with the U.S.
Department of the Treasury, released a set of proposals" (hereinafter
4 The concept of deferral is discussed infra, in section II, providing an overview of
United States tax basics.
5 Dane Mott, JP. Morgan & Co. North America Equity Research (May 16, 2012).
6 OECD Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (2013), http://www.oecd.org/tax/
beps.htm, (hereinafter "BEPS Report").
Id. at 33-45 (Key Tax Principles and Opportunities for Base Erosion and Profit
Shifting).
Id. at 42.
9 Id. at 43.
10 Id. at 44.
The President's Framework for Business Tax Reform: A Joint Report by the White
House and the Department of the Treasury (Feb. 2012), http://www.treasury.gov/
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the "Proposal") to reform the United States' international tax system.
The proposed changes to the current system represent an attempt to
combat tax avoidance strategies employed by U.S. based MNCs. In
light of the United States' current fiscal situation, there are few reform
strategies available that will be popular with corporations as well as
boost revenue for the government. 12
This Note will first provide in Section II an overview of the
current international tax system and discuss the essential elements of
the United States' domestic international corporate income taxation
rules. Next, the common standards and methods used to evaluate
international tax systems and proposed changes to those systems will
be reviewed. Section III will briefly summarize the methods MNCs
employ to produce stateless income, as well as utilize the well-publi-
cized example of Google's Double Dutch Irish Sandwich technique to
demonstrate the ease with which MNCs can employ and replicate
these strategies. Section IV will then discuss the Proposal's proposed
changes to the current U.S. international taxation system and their
corresponding implications for MNCs as well as present several
critiques that would need to be addressed if adopting the President's
framework were in fact to happen. Section V will provide an overview
of Representative Dave Camp's discussion draft proposing that the
United States move to a territorial tax system. Finally, Section VI will
discuss why Representative Camp's proposal should be adopted
instead of the President's proposal.
II. OVERVIEW
Before discussing the proposed changes to the existing US tax
system, it is important to have a general understanding of how the
system currently operates. Further it is important to understand how
the proposed changes to the system would affect not just the United
States, but also the global economy.
resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/The-Presidents-Framework-for-Business-Tax-
Reform-02-22-2012.pdf (hereinafter The President's Framework for Business Tax
Reform).
12 Kristen A. Parillo, US. Tax Reform More Likely as Part of Larger Economic
Package, Says Former Lawmaker, Tax Analysts (Sep. 28, 2012).
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A. International Tax - Our Current System
While reading about or listening to discussions concerning
reform of the United States' international tax system, the debate is
frequently over whether the United States should convert from a
worldwide to territorial system of taxation. These two systems of
international taxation represent the foundation or starting point from
which almost all countries' international tax systems have grown. It is
important to note that a worldwide system is actually a residence
system, under which a country taxes its own residents on their
worldwide income, regardless of where that income is earned. Under
the opposing territorial system, income is only taxed at its source, or in
the country in which it is earned.
The current U.S. tax system is purportedly a residence-based or
worldwide tax system. However, the current system has elements of
both a residence-based and territorial tax system. The United States'
international tax system can be seen as a worldwide tax system due to
the fact that it taxes income earned by U.S. citizens or residents
regardless of where the income is earned. The United States' inter-
national tax system also contains elements of territorial tax systems in
that it includes elements such as deferral and cross-crediting. Deferral
and cross-crediting are important tools used by multinational U.S.
firms to generate stateless income.13 Stateless income includes foreign
earnings of a U.S. multinational that are retained outside of the U.S. in
order to avoid taxation upon repatriation of that income. The creation
of stateless income depletes the United States' tax base and is a
primary focus of the Obama Administration's proposed changes to the
U.S. international tax system. 14
One of the fundamental concepts within the United States'
international tax system is the realization requirement. This require-
ment provides that income is not taxed until there is a realization
event. This concept is key to the creation of stateless income because it
provides multinational firms with the ability to defer certain foreign
earnings indefinitely. The Proposal seeks to eliminate deferral of
income earned by foreign subsidiaries of U.S based MNCs by placing a
13 Kleinbard, supra note 3, at 727-33.
14 The President's Framework for Business Tax Reform, supra note 11, at 1.
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current, mandatory minimum tax on all foreign-owned subsidiaries'
earnings.
The U.S. tax system's realization requirement allows multina-
tional firms to delay taxation of foreign subsidiaries' earnings until the
income is repatriated in the form of a dividend to the parent company.
This foreign source income can be divided into four categories:
(1) profits of foreign incorporated subsidiaries; (2) current payment
income; (3) branch income; and (4) Subpart F income.15 Only the first
category, profits of foreign incorporated subsidiaries, is eligible for
deferral. Each of the other categories is taxed currently.
The profits of a U.S. multinational's subsidiary incorporated
abroad are not taxed until they are repatriated. As discussed below,
this ability to defer profits of foreign subsidiaries allows for significant
tax arbitrage. When foreign source earnings are repatriated, a foreign
tax credit ("FTC") is allowed against the U.S. tax. 16 This foreign tax
credit can then be used to offset U.S. taxes on the repatriated earnings
or on similar income from another, likely low-tax rate jurisdiction.
Current payment income includes direct payments such as
royalties and interest. Current payment income is taxable currently.
The methods used to offset the taxes on this income are discussed
below. Taxes on this type of income are generally offset through the
use of cross-crediting foreign tax credits. Because this income is taxed
currently and cannot be deferred, the ability to shield this income
through the use of FTCs is very important to large MNCs.
Branch income is income that is earned by foreign branches of
a multinational organization. Because these branches are not
separately incorporated, their income is treated as having been earned
by the parent company and is taxed currently.
Subpart F income is income that falls within the rules specified
in Subpart F of the Internal Revenue Code.17 Subpart F income
includes passive income, or income that could easily be shifted to low-
tax jurisdictions. However, as seen later in the discussion of the
methods used to generate stateless income, Subpart F has become
15 Jane G. Gravelle, Moving to a Territorial Income Tax: Options and Challenges,
2012 WL 3277161 (Congressional Research Service (C.R.S.) (hereinafter Gravelle,
Moving to a Territorial Income Tax)).
16 Internal Revenue Code § 901(a).
17 Internal Revenue Code, Subpart F, §§ 951-964.
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significantly less effective in recent years due to check-the-box
regulations 8 and look-thru exceptions. The Proposal does not
specifically mention any changes to the current check-the-box rules;
although changes to the check-the-box regulations were proposed by
the Obama Administration in 2009, they were not retained in the
revenue proposals for the 2011 fiscal year.19
Another important aspect of international tax planning within
the Subpart F regime is the look-thru rule for related controlled foreign
corporations. The look-thru exception operates by excluding certain
income from the definition of Subpart F income and thus from
currently taxable income of the parent company.20 This is particularly
important for intercompany dividends or interest payments, which
would otherwise be treated as Subpart F income and thereby includ-
ible in the parent company's income.
B. Evaluating International Tax Systems & Neutrality Standards
There are several competing methods commonly used to
evaluate proposed changes to international tax systems. The older,
traditional methods include Capital Export Neutrality, Capital Import
Neutrality, and National Neutrality. The more recent model, proposed
by Desai and Hines, is Capital Ownership Neutrality. 21
These models generally evaluate tax systems from the stand-
point that a set of tax rules should not dictate, by encouraging or
discouraging, particular investment activity. In other words,
investment decisions should be based on business reasons rather than
taxation. This concept is known as tax neutrality. However, as the
OECD's recent BEPS Project indicates, MNCs likely make significant
investment or corporate structuring decisions that arise out of the
desire to minimize their income tax burdens.
' U.S. Dep't of the Treasury Reg. § 301.7701-3(b)(2).
19 U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, General Explanations of the Administration's Fiscal
Year 2010 Revenue Proposals 28-40, 28 (2009).
20 Internal Revenue Code § 954(c)(6)(A). The look-thru exception actually excludes
certain income received from a controlled foreign corporation from the definition of
"foreign personal holding company income," which is defined in § 954(c)(1).
21 Mihir A. Desai & James R. Hines Jr., Evaluating International Tax Reform, 56
NAT'L TAx J. 487 (2003) (hereinafter Desai & Hines, Evaluating International Tax
Reform).
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The Capital Export Neutrality ("CEN") standard, largely
shaped by the work of Peggy Musgrave, states that a tax system will
meet the standard if a firm's investments are taxed at the same rate,
regardless of where the investment is made.22 Thus, under a tax system
that satisfies the CEN standard, the firm's decision to invest domes-
tically or abroad is not affected by taxation, but rather by business
factors and will lead to more efficient allocation of capital. The United
States' current worldwide tax system is in line with this standard;
however, this is not entirely true due to the fact that the current
deferral rules create incentives to increase foreign investments.
Capital Import Neutrality ("CIN") states that all firms doing
business within a market will be taxed the same rate.23 CIN is thus
embodied in the territorial or source-based tax systems. MNCs have
been strong advocates of this approach and there have been several
proposals in Congress that have advocated this approach. 24
The third traditional standard used to evaluate international
tax systems is national neutrality ("NN"). Under the NN standard, a
nation's total returns on capital, which are shared by the government
and the taxpayer, are the same no matter which jurisdiction the
investment is made in.25 Under this standard, taxes paid in foreign
jurisdictions are deductible rather than creditable against domestic
taxes. Thus, foreign taxes on foreign-source income are only deductible
and the domestic taxpayers incur a higher domestic tax liability
because the foreign taxes do not reduce domestic taxes dollar-for-
dollar.
Desai and Hines' capital ownership neutrality ("CON") repre-
sents a break from prior neutrality standards in that it takes into
account both where capital is invested as well as who owns the
22 Peggy Brewer Richman, Taxation of Foreign Investment Income: An Economic
Analysis (1963); Peggy B Musgrave, United States Taxation of Foreign Investment
Income: Issues and Arguments (1969) (hereinafter Musgrave, Issues).
23 Michael S. Kroll, Reconsidering International Tax Neutrality, 64 TAX L. REV. 99,
119 21 (2011).
24 See Gmbert-Mutti proposal (included in President Bush's Advisory Panel on Tax
Reform proposal in 2005). See also Gravelle, Moving to a Territorial Income Tax,
supra note 15, for a discussion of other past proposals and recommendations to
Congress that the United States move to a Territorial system.
25 Musgrave, Issues, supra note 22, at 134 n. 7.
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capital.26 The analysis considers who owns capital from the perspective
that investors in countries with varying tax systems will have differing
incentives to choose particular investments. This new model represents
an important step in evaluating tax systems in that it takes into account
additional real life factors beyond the location of investment. Under
Desai and Hines' model, CON may be achieved by the adoption of
either a worldwide or territorial system of taxation by all countries.27
III. STATELESS INCOME
A. An Example of Stateless Income: The Double Dutch Irish
Sandwich
The recent proposals to alter the U.S. international tax system
came after it was noted in the news that Google, Inc., as well as other
prominent U.S. multinational organizations, had recently paid taxes at
astonishingly low income tax rates. Prior to discussing the general
methods with which companies are able to create stateless income, it is
important to see an example of a commonly employed and easily
replicated method of avoiding the U.S. taxes. The method that Google
employed is commonly referred to as the Double Dutch Irish
Sandwich. This method is used to remove income from the jurisdiction
in which the actual production of the income occurs. The resulting
level of taxation on that income is significantly lower than would
otherwise be the case.
The first step in the process required the transfer of intellectual
property to an Irish subsidiary that is a registered Bermudan tax
resident. Prior to its public offering in 2003, Google, Inc. began this
process by entering into a cost sharing agreement with a wholly-
owned Irish subsidiary, Google Ireland Holdings ("Ireland Holdings").
The cost sharing agreement provided that Ireland Holdings would
acquire the rights to some of Google Inc.'s intangible property for a
territory consisting of Europe, the Middle East, and Africa ("EMEA").
This transaction likely occurred at the time it did due to the fact that
26 Desai & Hines, Evaluating International Tax Reform, supra note 21, at 487. See also
Mihir A. Desai & James R. Hines Jr., Old Rules and New Realities: Corporate Tax
Policy in a Global Setting, 57 NAT'L TAX J. 937 (2004).
27 James R. Hines Jr., Reconsidering the Taxation ofForeign Income, 62 TAX L. REV.
269, 276 (2009).
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the transaction was potentially taxable and thus it was likely more
beneficial to complete the transaction prior to the intellectual property
undergoing any significant appreciation in value.28 This portion of the
transaction also included an agreement that Ireland Holdings would
bear future development costs in proportion to the size that the EMEA
market bore to worldwide market for the particular Google technol-
ogies.29 The Internal Revenue Service approved this portion of the
transaction in a non-public Advance Pricing Agreement in 2006.
It is important to note that while Ireland Holdings was
incorporated in Ireland, Ireland Holdings is a Bermudan tax resident.
This is crucial because Ireland has a low corporate tax rate, and, under
Irish law Ireland Holdings is treated as a Bermudan company.30
The next step in the process occurred when Google established
a Dutch subsidiary ("Google BV") to which Ireland Holdings then
licensed its rights to the intellectual property. Google BV then licensed
the rights to a lower tier subsidiary, Google Ireland Limited ("Ireland
Limited"). Ireland Limited then began licensing the intellectual
property through the EMEA territories and collecting billions of
dollars of income.31 Importantly, Google BV and Ireland Limited had
likely "checked-the-box" for U.S. tax purposes and thus effectively
disappeared for purposes of applying U.S. international tax rules.
The entire picture can be seen once each of the subsidiaries is
established. Income earned throughout the EMEA territories first goes
to Ireland Limited. This income is effectively only taxed in Ireland;
however, Ireland Limited must only pay the 12.5 percent Irish
corporate tax rate on the residual income left over after Ireland Limited
makes sizable royalty payments to Google BV. Google BV then makes
almost identical payments to Ireland Holdings. Because Ireland
Holdings is a Bermudan company from an Irish perspective, income
earned by Ireland Holdings is not taxed in Ireland. However, Ireland
Holding is not subject to tax in Bermuda because Bermuda has no
corporate income tax. Google BV is also a critical component of this tax
planning scheme due to the fact that it eliminates any potential
28 Stephen C. Loomis, The Double Irish Sandwich: Reforming Overseas Tax Havens,
43 ST. MARY's LJ. 825, 837 n.44 (hereinafter Loomis, The Double Irish Sandwich).
29 Kleinbard, supra note 3, at 709 n. 14.
30Loomis, The Double Irish Sandwich, supra note 28, at 50.
31 Kleinbard, supra note 3, at 708.
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withholding tax that Ireland would impose if the royalty payments
were made from an Irish company, Ireland Limited, to a Bermudan
company, Ireland Holdings.32
Astonishingly, through the use of its subsidiaries, Google is
able to stream the income, in the form of royalties it receives
throughout the EMEA territories from Ireland Limited, to Google BV
and then back to Ireland Holdings, all the while paying minimal taxes
on the residual income left after the royalty payments are made. For
U.S. tax purposes, Ireland Holdings, an Irish company with a
Bermudan branch, is the only company that seemingly exists. Further,
Google is able to defer repatriating the income that comes to rest with
Ireland Holdings and achieve the incredibly low 2.4 percent tax rate.33
There is one major limitation to the repatriation of foreign
source income: the income cannot be brought back into the United
States unless the corporation is willing to pay the difference between
the taxes already paid on the income and the United States statutory
rate of thirty-five percent. The IRS has been largely successful at
stopping tax avoidance schemes. 34 Because repatriating foreign source
income is not favorable for corporations that go to great lengths to
avoid paying taxes, many corporations wait for repatriation holidays
such as the one that took place in 2005 as a result of Internal Revenue
Code section 965.35
B. Production of Stateless Income
The production of stateless income is an issue that may result
in significant erosion of the domestic tax base of U.S. multinationals. In
Edward D. Kleinbard's Stateless Income, Kleinbard compares the
production of stateless income by U.S. multinationals to the work of a
master distiller who, through careful planning, is able to draw upon
various casks of foreign source income and the related foreign tax
32 Id. at 713 n. 20.
33 Jesse Drucker, Google 2.4% Rate Shows How $60 Billion Lost to Tax Loopholes,
Bloomberg (Oct. 21, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-10-21/google-2-4-
rate-shows-how-60-billion-u-s-revenue-lost-to-tax-loopholes.html.
3 4 Hal Hicks & David J. Sotos, The Empire Strikes Back (Again) Killer Bs, Deadly Ds
and Code Sec. 367 As the Death Star Against Repatriation Rebels, May June INT'L
TAX J. 37 (2008).
35 Kleinbard, supra note 3, at 720 n. 33.
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credits in order to create a blend of income to be repatriated with the
minimum U.S. tax possible. 36 The goal is to have neither excess foreign
tax credits, nor excess limitation. The master distiller has several tools
at his disposal to generate stateless income; however, at a fundamental
level each of those tools is premised on the global tax norm of treating
corporate subsidiaries as entirely separate jurisdictional entities.37
The first tool available to the master distiller is the ability to
"strip out" high-tax source country earnings through internal group
leverage.38 Prior to the check-the-box regulations enacted in 1997, it
was slightly more difficult for U.S. multinationals to generate stateless
income through internal group leverage.39 However, with the enact-
ment of the check-the-box regulationS40 it is now possible to easily
avoid generating Subpart F income.41 As discussed previously, the
controlled foreign corporation look-thru rules also allow corporations
to shift income abroad without incurring U.S. taxes under Subpart F.42
Transfer pricing is another mechanism U.S. multinationals can
use to generate stateless income.43 Transfer pricing is the term used to
refer to the prices at which intragroup transactions are effected.
Transfer pricing strategies are extremely valuable to U.S. firms seeking
to remove income to foreign jurisdictions due to the fact that the
previously described earnings striping strategies are ineffective due to
Subpart F rules.
A third commonly employed method of stateless income
generation is the arbitrage of different legal systems. For example,
looking back at the Double Dutch Irish Sandwich example, Google has
ability to "check-the-box" and hide its subsidiaries completely for U.S.
tax purposes but not for Irish or Dutch purposes.
3 6 Id. at 725.
37 Id. at 728.
38 d
39 Id. at 730.40 U.S. Dep't of the Treasury Reg. § 301.7701-3.
41 Kleinbard, supra note 3, at 731.
42 See Internal Revenue Code § 954(c)(6)(A), supra note 20.
43 Id. at 734. See also id. at 734 n. 71 for representative list of notable works studying
the impact of transfer pricing on the generation of stateless income.
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IV. PRESIDENT OBAMA'S PROPOSAL
A. The Proposal's Main Points
The Obama Administration's framework for tax reform
contained four key components: (1) a reduction of the corporate tax
rate from 35 percent to 28 percent, (2) a minimum tax on foreign source
income in low-tax countries, (3) a current tax on excess profits associ-
ated with shifting intangibles low tax jurisdictions, and (4) limitations
on the deductibility of interest payments attributable to overseas
investment.44 While the Proposal would effectuate significant change
within the current U.S. tax system, it fails to address the issues arising
out the check-the-box regulations. This section will discuss each of the
proposals in turn.
1. Reducing the Corporate Tax Rate from 35 Percent to 28
Percent
The Administration's first proposal recommends reducing the
corporate tax rate from 35 percent to 28 percent. The Administration
justifies reducing the corporate tax rate on the grounds that the
reduction would encourage greater investment in the United States as
well as reduce tax-related economic distortions. 45 The Proposal
recognizes that the current relatively high U.S. statutory rate
encourages multinational corporations to shift income and investments
away from the U.S. Further, the Proposal recognizes that the high
statutory rate encourages firms to engage in the practice of generating
stateless income, thereby eroding the U.S. tax base and decreasing
corporate tax receipts. 46
2. A Mandatory Minimum Tax on Foreign Source Income
in Low Tax Countries
The second major proposal the Administration puts forth is
placing a mandatory minimum tax on foreign source income. The
Proposal does not state what that rate would be. While this is not a
complete end to deferral, it would represent a step in that direction.
44 The President's Framework for Business Tax Reform, supra note 11, at 1.
4 51 d. at 6-7.461d at 7n. 11.
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The Proposal recognizes that firms do have legitimate business reasons
for leaving some income abroad;47 however, the Proposal goes on to
state that this minimum tax seeks to deter corporations from locating
income in low-tax jurisdictions solely in an attempt to avoid paying
taxes in the U.S.48
3. Tax on Excess Intangibles
The third reform proposed by the Administration states that
excess profits associated with shifting intangibles to low tax jurisdic-
tions would be taxed currently as opposed to the year in which those
profits are repatriated to U.S.49 This proposal would be accomplished
by expanding subpart F income to include excess intangible income
generated by a sale, lease, license, and shared risk, development or cost
sharing agreement.50 This proposal is aimed at curbing the abuse of
transfer pricing rules.51 Under Internal Revenue Code Section 482 and
its corresponding regulations, transfers of intangible assets must be
conducted at arm's length 52 and the income received must be
commensurate with the income attributable to the intangible asset.53
4. Limiting Interest Deductions
The Administration's last major change to the U.S. interna-
tional tax system is a clear attempt at reducing U.S. multinationals'
preference for debt financing. The Proposal would require that interest
deductions attributable to an overseas investment be delayed until the
related income is repatriated and subsequently taxed in the United
4 7 Id. at 9.
48 d
4 9 Id. at 14.
50 U.S. Dep't of Treasury, General Explanations of the Administration's FY2013
Revenue Proposals, February 2012, http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-
policy/Documents/General-Explanations-FY2013.pdf, at 88-89 (hereinafter Treasury,
General Explanations FY2013).
5 Id. at 88.
52 Kleinbard, supra note 3, at 710. As Kleinbard points out in Stateless Income, it is
somewhat hard to believe that a wholly owned subsidiary could truly negotiate at
"arm's length" with its parent company.
53 Treasury, General Explanations FY2013, supra note 50, at 88.
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States.54 This provision would effectively limit multinational's ability
to use foreign tax credits to shelter income from low tax countries. The
Proposal would also decrease the incentives that U.S.-based corpora-
tions have for moving investments and jobs overseas.55
B. A Critique of the President's Framework If It Were Adopted
If the President's Proposal was evaluated in a vacuum,
irrespective of other current proposals for reforming the United States'
international tax system, there are two major issues that need to be
clarified. The first major issue is the lack of a specific rate for the
mandatory minimum tax. Second, the Proposal lacks a plan to deal
with interim issues that arise during the transition between the new
and current system.
1. Mandatory Minimum Tax Rate Is Missing
The Proposal's first major issue is the lack of a specified rate for
the mandatory minimum tax placed on all U.S. based MNC's foreign
subsidiaries. This is obviously an issue for multiple reasons. It is
difficult to evaluate the impact or likelihood of success of this
provision without knowing what the rate will be. The provision is
aimed at reducing the attractiveness of tax havens as well as curbing
the benefits offered by deferral.
If the rate is set too low U.S. based MNCs will merely continue
their stateless income planning with a slightly higher marginal rate;
however, a low rate would not achieve the goal of incentivizing MNCs
to repatriate more of their excess cash. If the rate is set too high U.S.
based MNCs may be put at a competitive disadvantage in foreign
markets due to the fact that their competitors can earn the same
returns while operating at a less efficient level.
2. Implementation and Transition
The second issue with the Proposal is its lack of a timeline for
implementation and its lack of a plan for how U.S. based MNCs
operating under the current system would be treated in the interim or
54 The President's Framework for Business Tax Reform, supra note 11, at 15.
Treasury, General Explanations FY2013, supra note 50, at 85.
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transition period. The likelihood of implementation is a question of
politics and speculation and based on current partisan behavior may
never come to pass. However, reform of the United States' interna-
tional tax system may be done in the near future as Congress has made
this an important issue in the recent months. Representative Dave
Camp has taken it upon himself to head the reform and has begun
making headway - at the very least, another step in the right direction.
However, this article's focus is not on the likelihood of the
Proposal's political success, it is an analysis of the merits. As such, the
greater issue with the implementation of the Proposal is the lack of a
plan for dealing with the transition period. Contrary to the Proposal's
claim that it will simplify the Code, even a simplified version of the
current system will be immensely complex. This is a massive under-
taking that will require analysis of multiple issues as well as working
with U.S. based MNCs to ensure that they are not disproportionally
impacted. The undertaking will need to determine what will happen to
U.S. based MNC's excess cash currently held abroad as well as when
the new system will begin taking effect.
V. REPRESENTATIVE CAMP'S PROPOSAL TO MOVE TO A TERRITORIAL
SYSTEM
A. A Review of David Camp's Discussion Draft
Representative Camp's discussion draft 6 ("Discussion Draft")
represents a radical change in the way the United States taxes income
earned by U.S. MNCs abroad. Generally, the proposal would move the
U.S. to a territorial system of taxation whereby the majority of U.S.
MNC's foreign source income would be exempt from tax currently and
would be subject to minimal tax upon repatriation to the U.S. This
portion of the paper will first discuss the major points of the Discus-
sion Draft and then discuss the three alternative methods that the
proposal would alter the Subpart F regime.
56 House Ways and Means Chairman David Camp's Discussion Draft (hereinafter
Camp Discussion Draft) (Oct. 2011), available at http://waysandmeans.house.gov/
uploadedfiles/discussion draft.pdf.
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1. The Main Points
The Discussion Draft would make several major revisions to
the current U.S. international tax system. The first change would be a
reduction in the top statutory corporate tax rate from the current 35
percent to 25 percent.57 The Discussion Draft would also mandate a
one-time tax of 5.25 percent on currently unremitted earnings.58
The Discussion Draft's major departure from the current
international tax system comes in the form the adoption of a 95 percent
dividend received deduction for foreign-sourced dividends from
controlled foreign corporations in which the U.S. shareholder owns at
least 10 percent. 59 There is no foreign tax credit available for this
dividend income, but, as will be discussed, foreign tax credits are
available for income subject to the revised Subpart F rules. There is also
no deduction for foreign taxes paid on dividends. 60 The 95 percent
exemption is denied if the shareholder has held the stock of controlled
foreign corporation for less than one year.61 Foreign branches of U.S.
corporations are also treated as controlled foreign corporations in that
the branch's income is treated as a dividend paid to the parent
corporation and is eligible for the 95 percent exemption.
The next major change is the elimination of earnings and
profits and foreign tax credit pooling.62 This elimination is made
because foreign tax credits would only be available to offset U.S. tax on
Subpart F income. This will likely be a well-received change as the
calculation of these items for numerous subsidiaries can be incredibly
time consuming and complicated. This provision is aimed at simpli-
fying the current tax system.
The Discussion Draft also modifies the way foreign-source
income is characterized. Under current law, foreign-source income and
related tax credits are segregated into two statutory baskets: general
category income and passive category income.63 Under the Discussion
Draft, the basketing rules would be eliminated and there would only
17 Id. at 3.
" Id. at 24.
' 9Id. at 9.
60 d.
61 Id. at 16.
62 Id. at 31-40.
63 Internal Revenue Code § 904(d)(2).
2013 157
U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV.
be one category of foreign-source income, which would be subject to
the Subpart F rules.64
2. Subpart F Options
The Discussion Draft proposes three alternatives for modifying
the Subpart F regime.65 As discussed, income deemed Subpart F
income is income that is earned abroad, included currently in the
corporation's taxable income, and subject to the statutory income tax
rate (under the Discussion Draft that rate would be 25 percent).
Option A of the Discussion Draft would apply to excess
income earned from the transfer of intangibles from the U.S. to a
foreign controlled corporation, and the income generated from the
intangible would be taxed at a rate below 10 percent. Income derived
from the intangible that exceeds 150 percent of the costs associated
with the intangible would be considered Subpart F income.66 Under
Option B of the Discussion Draft, income earned by a controlled
foreign corporation would be considered Subpart F if it is neither
derived from the active conduct of a trade or business in the controlled
foreign corporations home country, nor if it is not taxed at an effective
rate above 10 percent.67
Option C of the Discussion Draft would tax foreign intangible
income at a reduced rate by providing a 40 percent deduction in the
U.S.68 Further, all income earned by controlled foreign corporations
from exploitation of intangibles would be considered Subpart F
income if it is not subject to a tax rate in excess of the United States'
statutory rate (21 percent), regardless of where the intangibles are
exploited.69
64 Camp Discussion Draft, supra note 57, at 36.
6 5 Id. at 44-57.
6 6 Id. at 44.
6 7 Id. at 50.
6 81 Id. at 53.
6 9 Id. at 56.
158 V. 21
TNTFRNATIONAT BTI STNFSS TAX RFFORM
VI. MOVING TO A TERRITORIAL SYSTEM - CAMP SUCCEEDS WHERE THE
PRESIDENT FAILS
A. Reducing the Corporate Income Tax Rate and Preference for
Debt over Equity
As discussed above, the Proposal would reduce the corporate
income tax rate from 35 percent to 28 percent and the Discussion Draft
would reduce it to 25 percent. This is a much-needed reduction as the
United States' high corporate tax rate is an outlier among developed
countries. The current high corporate tax rate reduces incentive for
investment in the U.S. by both domestic and foreign corporations. The
high corporate tax rate also discourages U.S. based MNCs from
repatriating income that could be invested at home, in the United
States.
Another benefit of reducing the corporate income tax rate is
the reduction of corporations' preference for debt over equity
financing. There is a natural bias towards debt financing because
interest payments are deductible by corporations whereas dividends
are not. A reduction in the corporate tax rate alone would reduce
corporations' preference for debt because a lower rate reduces taxation
of equity-financed investments and increases the after-tax cost of debt
finance. 70
The deductibility of interest payments gives rise to a basic tax
arbitrage opportunity, whereby a corporation incurs debt domestically
to fund operations, instead of repatriating foreign source income, and
uses the resultant interest deductions to decrease the firm's U.S. tax
liability. The President's proposal seeks to address this issue by
limiting interest deductions until related income is repatriated.71 This
provision, along with the proposed mandatory minimum tax on
income earned by foreign subsidiaries, seeks to force corporations to
bring income back to the United States. This provision would force
corporations to track income related to specific debt and add even
more complexity to an already complex web of tax laws. As discussed
below, there are other methods of taxation which may be more useful
in incentivizing U.S. based MNCs to repatriate income without adding
70 Corporate Tax Reform - The Time Is Now, Business Round Table (hereinafter Bus.
Round Table, Corporate Tax Reform), Apr. 15, 2013, at 24.
71 The President's Frameworkfor Business Tax Reform, supra note 11, at 15.
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more layers of complexity to the United States' already flawed system.
The Discussion Draft would accomplish this simplification by elimina-
ting the need to track earning and profits pools as well as foreign tax
credit pools.
B. Scratch the Mandatory Minimum Tax and Move to a Territorial
Based Tax System
One of the arguments frequently put forth by corporations
lobbying for the adoption of a territorial system in the United States
revolves around maintaining competitiveness of U.S. MNCs abroad.72
The argument is premised on the idea that U.S. MNCs are less compe-
titive in foreign markets because they are taxed more heavily than the
domestic competitors in the foreign market. Further, American firms
are allegedly disadvantaged as compared to foreign MNCs because
U.S. based MNCs are faced with a greater tax burden when they bring
foreign earnings back to the United States whereas foreign firms face a
lower tax burden upon repatriation to their home countries. While this
may be true, it is important to point out that U.S. based MNCs have the
ability to generate stateless income, and thereby "tax rents," while they
defer this greater tax burden indefinitely through deferral.73
While a mandatory minimum tax on U.S. MNC's foreign
subsidiaries may sound good in a political debate, the employment of
such a tax is an unnecessarily burdensome method of achieving the
Proposal's stated goals. The minimum tax on U.S. MNC's foreign
subsidiaries seeks to reduce incentives U.S. MNCs have for leaving
income offshore rather than repatriating the income. The minimum tax
would purportedly diminish the incentives U.S. MNCs have to locate
income in low or no-tax jurisdictions and instead encourage them to
repatriate income on the premise that the increase in tax rate from the
72 See generally Bus. Round Table, Corporate Tax Reform, supra note 70.
73 Kleinbard, supra note 3, at 754. "Stateless income tax planning offers multinational
firms, but not wholly domestic ones, the opportunity to convert high-tax country pre-
tax marginal returns into low-tax country inframarginal returns, by redirecting pre-tax
income from high-tax country to the low-tax one. By doing so multinational firms can
be said to capture 'tax rents.' Their inframarginal returns stem not from some unique
high-value asset, but rather from their unique status as structurally able to move pretax
income across national borders."
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minimum tax to the U.S. statutory rate would be minimal and thus
more justifiable to shareholders and investors.
The proposed minimum tax seeks to encourage U.S. MNC's to
repatriate deferred foreign income in order to invest here at home in
the United States. While the Proposal touts the benefits of this
repatriation and investment in the United States, the main goal of the
mandatory minimum tax is clearly increasing corporate income tax
revenues. While fiscal responsibility is important, it is this Note's
position that both economic growth and fiscal responsibility will both
benefit from moving to a territorial tax system.
Moving to a territorial tax system would allow U.S. MNCs to
bring currently deferred and future income back into the United States
with little tax consequence. An in-depth discussion and analysis of
whether economic growth benefits more from government versus
corporate spending and investment is beyond the scope of this Note.
However, it significant that if U.S. MNCs repatriated just half of the
$1.7 trillion currently maintained abroad, the funds available for
investment in the United States would be approximately greater than
the government spending and tax relief provided by the 2009
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act.74
C. Harmonizing the United States' International Tax Policies and
the International Systems of Corporate Income Taxation
At the very least, the Obama Administration's proposal
represents a starting point from which future discussions of reform can
be had. The Proposal also represents an attempt to begin limiting
multinational enterprises ability to strip income out of high-tax
jurisdictions around the world. As evidenced by the current global
debate about base erosion and profit shifting, the United States is not
the only country facing this issue. As noted in the OECD's BEPS
Report, international tax reform must be done at the domestic level -
i.e. by each individual country.75 As such, each country must begin
developing its own methods capable of dealing with the issue.
While the Proposal may be a starting point for a larger
discussion about international tax reform in the United States, it is not
74 Bus. Round Table, Corporate Tax Reform, supra note 70, at 34.
7 BEPS Report, supra note 6, at 10.
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the best proposal available. Representative David Camp has proposed
a territorial system that is not only revenue neutral, but also in line
with the reforms taking place internationally. Enacting Representative
Camp's proposal would not only benefit U.S. based MNCs but also the
United States' economy.
As other countries begin reforming their own tax codes, an
effort must be made to come to a consensus about how tax havens are
to be dealt with. Countries with extremely low corporate income tax
rates, or none at all, must be included in the discussion so that they do
not continue to offer MNCs the ability to avoid taxes elsewhere. Also,
it is important to recognize that countries such as Ireland and the
Netherlands must be dealt with as well due to their current systems,
which encourage tax arbitrage, at the detriment of many countries
within the EU and elsewhere.
It is the logical result of the current international tax system
that capital flows from the high tax jurisdictions and into low tax ones.
When considering how to reform the current system, it is important to
think about how to structure the rules so as to maximize the efficient
use of capital. While the United States is facing a fiscal crisis, increasing
taxes and dampening the rate of economic growth is not an effective
solution to the problem.
VII. CONCLUSION
As mentioned in the Arguments section, the Proposal is not an
end point for United States international tax reform, but is in fact a
starting point from which future debates can be had. The current
system not only fails at collecting an adequate amount of revenue for
the Treasury, but also distorts U.S. based MNC's investment decisions.
While it is not guaranteed that altering the current system will
immediately create new domestic investment, it will decrease the
significant tax incentives U.S. based MNCs have to invest abroad and
in turn foster more economically meaningful investment. The Obama
Administration's proposals represent a step toward that goal, albeit a
misguided one. While the Proposal does present lofty goals, it seeks to
achieve those goals with overly broad reforms that will not simplify
the currently opaque system, but instead add more layers of
complexity. Where the President's framework for reform lacks details,
Representative Camp's does not. Rep. Camp's proposal is more in line
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with international norms and represents a comprehensive overhaul of
the current tax system. As most will agree, our current system of
international taxation is in desperate need of reform, and simply
adding additional complex rules to an already intricate system is not
going to be the solution.
